

EX 771

Doc. No. 571

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Telegram (code) To be kept in locked file

Special train Westfalen No. 707

10 July '41, 1451 hr.

Arrival: 10 July '41 - 1600 hours

1. Code Office AA No. 634
2. German Embassy, TOKYO

Tel. Ciphers (Secret Cipher process) for the Ambassador personally.

Please wire immediately detailed analysis of conditions there. The following items are of greatest interest:

1. What are the present relations between Japan and the United States? I had already asked you to ask the Japanese Foreign Minister of your own accord and without orders, at the next occasion, whether the recent Japanese-American conversation on rapprochement has come to naught, and, above all, in which way they were terminated. Do you think it possible that the Japanese Ambassador in Washington, NOMURA, has made any oral assurances without any written agreement to the American government, which could have induced Roosevelt to occupy Iceland, knowing that in the rear he has nothing to fear from Japan? ✓

Please wire at once all available information on the subject of Japan-USA. Of course I request you not to show the slightest suspicion of the Japanese Government in official conversations.

2. What was the reaction to America's occupation of Iceland on the part of Japanese public opinion in the press, and above all of important government and army circles? How is this action evaluated? Have you the impression that there could be a tendency in Japan to nevertheless pursue a very short-sighted policy, let us say by coming to terms with America, thereby entangling it in a European war for a long time in order to have a free hand in East Asia without openly clashing with America, to adjust the Chinese question and further to expand in the South? I need not emphasize that this would be an extremely shortsighted policy which would mean that Japan could miss the great historical opportunity that will never come again.

With England and America, Japan will never be able to set up a Greater East Asia; this is only possible against those two countries. The Japanese Government would be under a terrible delusion believing to be able to diplomatically barter a gigantic, historical decision such as the establishment of their position of power in East Asia from the clever English and Americans.

Out of opportunism ^{they} would perhaps make certain temporary compromises but never yield on principles, in order to attack Japan at a good opportunity, seizing from her everything she has won during the last years with the blood of her army.

3. I request a detailed report on the reaction of the Japanese government to my message to Foreign Minister MATSUOKA. I fail to understand why you have not yet reported on this in detail. As Mr. MATSUOKA told you, he intended to lay the message before the Japanese Cabinet and the Emperor. What was their reaction? Has not Mr. MATSUOKA informed you about this during your conversation? If necessary please take up this question anew with the Japanese Foreign Minister, whereby an answer to this message must, of course, be expected by us.

4. Please thank the Japanese Foreign Minister at this opportunity for having transmitted the telegram/the Japanese ambassador at Moscow. It would be good if we could receive more news from Russia in this way at regular intervals.

Summarizing, I would like to say I still have full confidence in Japan's policy and in the Japanese Foreign Minister; above all because the present Japanese government would actually irresponsibly act against the future of their nation by not seizing this unique opportunity to solve the Russian problem as well as guarantee once and for all her expansion to the south and the settlement of the Chinese problem.

Since, as the Japanese ambassador is reporting from Moscow, Russia actually faces annihilation, which tallies, incidentally, with our observations insofar as we are able to appraise the situation during the present phase of the war, it is absolutely impossible that Japan does not solve the question of Vladivostok and of Siberian sphere.

It is, of course, to our advantage that Japan intends to secure for herself further positions in Indo-China, etc. just as any expansionist measure on the part of Japan is principally welcomed by us. As to the probable and certain consequences resulting from the occupation of Iceland by American fighting forces, as well as the attitude to be taken by us towards Japan in this connection, I will send you detailed instructions within the next days. I wish to say today for your order on what to say /Sprechregelung/ that the fact of American fighting forces having been sent for the military support of England, into the area of operations officially announced by us not only clearly proves the aggressive intentions of Roosevelt but that the penetration of American fighting forces into this combat area in the support of England amounts, as such, to an aggression against Germany and Europe. For it is impossible to join one of

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armies in a battle area where two armies fight each other without wishing to join in the shooting and without actually doing so. I do not doubt for one moment that in the case of an outbreak of hostilities between America and Germany Japan will stand by her obligations resulting from the Tri-Partite Pact. Even today it can be regarded as absolutely certain that America is the sole aggressor.

Besides, I request that you go on working, for the soonest possible participation of Japan in the war against Russia, as per my message to MATSUOKA, using all the means at your disposal, for earlier this participation in the war materializes, the better it is. The natural goal must be, as before, to bring about the meeting of Germany and Japan on the Trans-Siberian railroad before winter sets in. With the collapse of Russia the position of the Tri-Partite powers in the world will be so gigantic that the question of the collapse of England, that is, the absolute annihilation of the British Isles, will be only a question of time. The occupation of those of the remaining positions of the British Empire important to the Tri-Partite Powers will then be faced by an America completely cut off from all the rest of the world.

I have the rock-like conviction that the new order as desired by us will naturally be realized and will present no more unsurmountable difficulties if the Tri-Partite Powers will then firmly hold together, countering at once every action on the part of the Americans by employing the same weapons.

In future please report as often and as detailed as possible about all developments of the political situation there.

RIBBENTROP

Note: Sent on to Embassy, Tokyo, under No. 1018
Tel. Ktr. 10 July 1941.

Certificate

I, Ulrich Straus, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 571.

/S/ ULRICH STRAUS